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Agenda
 ASRS Reporting
 On-time Performance Events
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Precursors
Aviation Safety Reporting System
ASRS
FAA & NTSB
Normal Operations
Incidents
Injury
Accidents
Fatal Accidents
System-Wide Event Occurrences
 ASRS is complementary to other systems of reporting 
and focuses on precursors to the most severe events
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Monthly Intake
January 1981 – December 2012
ASRS Report Volume Profile
 37 years of confidential 
safety reporting
 Over 1,100,000 reports 
received
 Over 5,550 alert 
messages issued
 Over 6,700 reports per 
month, or 322 per 
working day
 Total report intake for 
2012 was 71,540
 Current rate estimate 
for 2013 is over 80,000
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ASRS Internal Screening Data Set
(100%)
n = 290,632
*Categories are not mutually exclusive.  Therefore, a single incident may be coded by ASRS analysts as involving more than one anomaly.
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 Top 20 Events Reported 2008 – 2012
Note: 100% of Dark Green Bars are given detailed analysis  
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ASRS Web Site
 Launch Oct. 2007
• Over 9 million sessions 
in 2012
 File ASRS Report
• Electronic
• Print and Mail
 Database Online
 ASRS Publications
 Program Information
 Immunity Policies
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov
September 2013Aviation Safety Reporting System
ASRS Database Online (DBOL)
 DBOL launched 2006
• Over 125,000 total online 
queries completed to date
• Over 19,600 queries completed 
in 2012
 Fixed field and text search 
capability
 Data formats (export)
• MS Word, Excel, CSV HTML
 Experts version is being 
proposed for the future
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov
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 ASRS is a national repository of aviation 
safety data 
 Company’s safety processes can use 
ASRS to obtain a systemic view of 
emerging issues
 Companies can review reports for 
similarities to their operations to help 
identify issues not yet encountered 
 ASRS can help companies recognize 
important issues within their own 
processes
Industry Integration with ASRS
Report Intake
~75,000 
reports / year
from across 
industry
Company 
#2
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Agenda
 ASRS Reporting
 On-time Performance Events
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System Context for On-time Performance
 ASRS reports provide detailed explanation 
and insight into on-time performance 
challenges 
 System contextual factors for on-time 
performance include human oversight 
tasks 
 But how does “Safety” fit into on-time 
performance expectations?
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James Reason - Performance Levels
Situations
Control Modes
Conscious Mixed Automatic
Routine
Trained-for 
Problems
Novel 
Problems
Knowledge 
Based
Rule-
Based
Skill-
Based
Source:  Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate Press. Hants, England
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James Reason - Types of Error
Errors
Skill-based slips 
and lapses
Mistakes
Knowledge-
based Mistakes
Rule-based 
Mistakes
Lapses of 
Memory
Attentional Slips 
of Action
• Misapplication of “Good” Rule
• Application of “Bad” Rule
• Failure to apply a “Good” rule 
a.k.a. (erroneous violation)
• Inadequate rules and problem solving
(highly error-prone)
Source:  Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate Press. Hants, England
Basic Human Factors
Complex Human and Organizational Factors
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On Time Performance Pressures
 ASRS reports reflect how on-time 
performance pressures may result in
• Incomplete work
• Skipping process steps to get back on time
• Incomplete problem solving / Troubleshooting
• Impaired attention to detail 
 These can lead to increases in downstream 
mistakes and associated costs
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On Time Performance Pressures (con’t)
 Work environment is characterized by
• Pressure to perform, survival mode
• Lack of priority for compliance norms
• “We have always done it this way”
• Tendency to underestimate complex issues
• Employment termination threats
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 A Maintenance Supervisor describes Air Carrier Line 
Maintenance environment that pushes mechanics to 
"rush" their work resulting in errors.  Reporter also 
stated there is a constant feeling of fear for their jobs.
“…we have had two instances where the Thrust Reverser 
Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) lockout pin was left in the aircraft 
causing the thrust r v rser not to deploy on landing. Mr. X came in 
during the first instance, (I was there), and rushed Aircraft 
Maintenance Technician X, (AMT) to hurry and finish the work he 
was performing on a Job Card; and in hurrying AMT X forgot the 
lockout pin. 
All…are fearful for their jobs, making a less than desirable place to 
work as well as asking for an accident or mistake to be made. We 
are constantly being rushed to HURRY and work on aircraft; 
problem is sometimes we are given unrealistic time frames. I 
understand the need for aircraft to fly as quickly as possible, but not 
to the point of rushing people beyond their means.…” (ACN 
993708 Excerpt)
Maintenance
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 Ground Personnel report describes a jetbridge being 
pulled without the help of a guide.  Hurry to make the 
On Time Departure was cited.
“… I was working with the Narita agents.  We were at crunch 
time already for an on-time departure and we were ready to 
pull the jetbridge and so I rang the bell several times and no 
ramp guide.  I had 2 agents telling me I was cleared to back 
the jetbridge not knowing that the air-conditioning was 
attached to the aircraft.  I only saw that the GPU was 
detached and when I was told…okay to go, I went ahead and 
pulled the bridge. I don’t ever pull the jetbridge without a 
guide but today we were so close to departure time….”
(ACN 1096099 Excerpt)
Gate / Ramp Operations
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Maintenance
 B757 Captain reported that a landing gear hydraulic 
leak reported prior to departure was not repaired 
even though the maintenance release indicated that 
it was. This air carrier management's push for on 
time departures is forcing flight crews and mechanics 
to not report defects or fake defect repairs.  
“…6) Mainten nce removed the ircraft from service and 
replaced the left main landing gear tilt actuator line, 
which has nothing to do with the #2 brake line leaking 3 
drops per minutes. 7) The plane was cleared at the 
departure airport of the hydraulic leak, however it was 
clearly “p ncil whipped” to achieve an on time eparture, 
thus completely sacrificing safety. Th re is a huge push 
at this carrier from the top down for on time departures. 
This pressure on our pilots, mechanics, gate agents and 
ramp personnel is clearly creating a chain of events that 
is severely compromising safety at any cost.”
(ACN 927510 Excerpt) 
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 Flight Attendant reported an Agent shut the FWD 
entry door before Flight Attendant Y had completed 
her exit row briefing and final passenger count.
“… We wer  late arriving into (city) by 10 minut s. 
Because of operations pressure to push the aircraft on 
time and despite my insistence that the door not be 
closed until cabin was secured, the operations agent 
shut the forward entry door before the Flight Attendant 
confirmed her passenger count and before briefing the 
emergency exit row passengers. The aircraft pushed 
back from jetway 3 minutes late. Our turn time was 21 
minutes.  Pressure on operations to push the aircraft on-
time creates these FAR violations.  Stop the pressure so 
that Flight Attendants can perform their duties as 
required..…” (ACN 1096099 Excerpt)22
Flight Crew / Cabin
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On Time Performance - Workarounds
 Work environment is characterized by
• Procedures that are
– Overly complex
– Incomplete
– Not readily available
– Inconsistent
• Inadequate resources (staff, tooling, parts)
• Facilities concerns (dirty, disorganized, inop)
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On Time Performance - Workarounds
 May result in
• Repeated omissions from wrong procedures
• Employee injuries
• High delay costs
• Unnecessary costs
• High employee turnover
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 Flight Attendant reported a Manager initiated aircraft 
boarding shortly after the flight attendants boarded, 
before the cabin preflight was complete and as 
aircraft cleaning was in progress.
“The flight cr w, flight attendants and I w e faced with bulk 
packages of newspapers in front of our equipment credenza 
filled with amenity kits, head sets and document bag. Old 
document bag and blue service kits from the inbound flight 
were never removed from plane. Four overhead bins in first 
class were filled with return amenity kits and headsets -
leaving no room for passengers' luggage…This situation was 
a standards procedure failure…. The purser, Captain, agent 
and zone are responsible for the flight - not a supervisor. The 
company manual gives me the authority to decide if the 
regulations have been met. It says preflight is a FAR and 
must be accomplished before closing the door. None of these 
requirements were accomplished because the Manager 
decided we could board.  (ACN 1037821 Excerpt)
Flight Crew / Cabin / Gate Operations
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 “I was given a new seal but not a new O-Ring.”“I was instructed how to install a Carbon Seal and 
given information on the Service Bulletin, but not [for] 
removal and installation of the seal, and as instructed, 
I removed the old seal and O-Ring. I was given a new 
seal but not a new O-Ring. I installed a new seal and 
installed the housing back in the engine, but I never 
installed the O-ring. The aircraft sat in Maintenance for 
a few more days and upon Run Checks, no leaks were 
noted. The aircraft made its flight and developed a 
large oil leak. It made its first few legs and had to divert 
on a later leg.” (ACN 1053059 Excerpt) 
Maintenance
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 Controller expressed concern regarding the BENGL 
RNAV SID procedure suggesting the implemented 
workaround efforts are not successful and that the 
SID should be NOTAMed out of service.
“This SID is flaw d in that aircraft departing the east 
runway on the RNAV SID, if the SID is flown, turn right, 
across the other 2 departure runways, to get to the 
programmed fixes on the departure. CVG has 
instituted a series of workarounds and memory joggers 
to keep the pilots from flying the SID, instead of 
NOTAMing out this and 2 other SIDs with similar 
problems” (ACN 903390 Excerpt)
Flight Operations / ATC
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 A flight crew misinterpret PDC route due to the 
transition being at the bottom of the chart in different 
formats.
“The transition is way at the bottom of the chart, and easy 
to mis . The route in the box and clearan e was 
confirmed by both Captain and First Officer and we 
thought we understood it, but were wrong. ATC corrected 
us on the SID and we continued uneventfully. ATC 
commented that several company crews have done the 
same thing and asked we bring it to company's attention. 
Each station ACARS clearance has a slightly different 
format. A “no kidding” standard from the FAA would be a 
great thing to prevent confusion.” (ACN 825838 Excerpt)
Flight Operations / ATC
September 2013Aviation Safety Reporting System
Summary of On Time Performance Issues
 The pressure of on-time departures may 
impair safety in several ways
 Operational pressures or a perceived 
need to implement workarounds may 
contribute to poor judgment leading to 
safety issues
 Companies can help employees avoid 
lapses in safety judgments that may occur 
in order to meet company expectations
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